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Abstract
The legacy of apartheid land policy in South Africaremains one of the most conspicuous manifestations ofpast injustices. To correct this legacy, diverse landreform efforts have centred on the constitutional
mandate for land restitution, redistribution and tenure reform.
The Transformation of Certain Rural Areas Act 94 of 1998
(Trancraa) is the first post-apartheid legislation to be passed and
implemented to reform communal land tenure. It aims to
transfer state land in 23 former coloured rural areas to
residents or accountable local institutions. During 2001 and
2002 civil society organisations, local people, municipalities and
the Department of Land Affairs introduced the Act in six areas
in Namaqualand of the Northern Cape.
During the same period, a Communal Land Rights Bill for the
former homelands has been the subject of consultation,
published in August 2002, and adopted in a fundamentally
revised version by Cabinet in October 2003 and by Parliament
in February 2004. With its reliance on non-elected traditional
councils, the Communal Land Rights Bill of 2003 departs in
major ways from the policy approach of Trancraa. Trancraa was
enacted in the context of the 1997 White Paper on South
African Land Policy with its emphasis on individual rights and
community choice about ownership and administration of land.
The Act emphasised the role of municipalities both in
implementation of tenure reform and envisaged future
governance.
In spite of dramatic policy changes, the experience of
implementing Trancraa in Namaqualand may hold lessons for
the implementation of the Communal Land Rights Bill with
respect to resources, process, power relations and protection of
rights. The Trancraa process represents a small but significant
investment by government, but the time, funding and
institutional support required to carry out effective tenure
reform was seriously underestimated. Furthermore, the Act and
implementation process did not address the constitutional right
to comparable redress, and did not include land development
or guarantees of future institutional support.
Strengthened tenure rights appear vulnerable if isolated from
training, finance and integrated development initiatives. A neo-
liberal assumption that property rights and markets by
themselves will transform rural areas where people are in deep
crisis due to unemployment, HIV/Aids, corruption and food
insecurity appears ill-founded and dangerous.
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Figure 1: Namaqualand and certain rural areas
Source: Timm Hoffman, University of Cape Town. Map: Simon Todd.
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1. Introduction: Towards land tenure reform in
South Africa
Following three and a half centuries of colonial andapartheid rule and exploitation, South Africasnegotiated revolution brought the first democraticallyelected government to power in 1994, and with it
expectations and promises about bringing an end to inequality.
The preamble of the 1996 Constitution holds that South Africa
belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity and resolves
to Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based
on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human
rights. The Bill of Rights commits government to ensuring
equitable access to land, providing tenure security or
comparable redress, and offering restitution of land to people
who have lost land due to racial discrimination after 1913. The
White Paper on South African Land Policy of 1997 recognises
that land rights are vested in people rather than institutions
such as tribal or other local authorities, and insists that
individual rights of members must be respected through
democratic decision making and nondiscrimination (DLA
1997:xii and section 3.20.2).
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Land reform has progressed with a range of pieces of
legislation, activities and achievements, but also with
increasing frustration at the lack of political priority, slow pace
and disappointing socioeconomic impacts of land reform (Lahiff
2001). Some 60 000 commercial farmers own 82 million ha
(67% of total area) and only 2.3% of commercial farmland has
been redistributed since 1994 (Kepe & Cousins 2002). The
ANC-led government now allocates about 0.35% (R1 billion3) of
public spending to land reform, of which about one third is
available to land redistribution and tenure reform (Mingo
2002).
An estimated 16 million people, or 35% of South Africas
population, live in former homelands that comprise less than
14% of the total land area. Whether in former coloured
reserves or homelands, insecure tenure is an aspect of the
persistent apartheid of space, assets and opportunities that
hinders economic development and leaves people vulnerable
(Ntsebeza 1999; Kepe 2001). Communal land tenure reform is
the most protracted part of South Africas land reform
programme and faces deep inequalities of gender, class and
race (Claassens 2000; Cousins 2002b). Ten years into the new
South Africa the majority of rural people are still waiting for
changes to make their land rights secure. The 1999 draft Land
Rights Bill was shelved after the change of minister that year. A
new draft Bill was discussed at the November 2001 National
Land Tenure Conference in Durban (RSA 2001), and in August
2002 government published a new Communal Land Rights Bill
(CLRB) for public review (RSA 2002). The debate involved
threats of violence from some traditional leaders who see
democratic principles as a threat to their power base (Moore &
Deane 2003). In October 2003 Cabinet adopted a dramatically
changed version of the Communal Land Rights Bill (RSA
2003a). The Bill placed the responsibility for land
administration with traditional local councils provided for in
the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act
(RSA 2003b). The Land Rights Bill was debated in highly
critical submissions and hearings in November 20034 and
approved by the parliamentary Portfolio Committee on
Agriculture and Land Affairs in January 2004 and by
Parliament on 12 February 2004.
However, a useful model of land tenure reform legislation has
already been enacted and implemented in relation to another
apartheid category of rural areas.  The Transformation of
Certain Rural Areas Act 94 of 1998 was drafted through a
consultative process in the mid-nineties as a result of civil
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 3
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society advocacy during and after the struggle against apartheid.
Trancraa was enacted in the context of the 1997 White Paper on
South African Land Policy with its emphasis on individual rights
and community choice about land ownership.  The Act
emphasised the role for municipalities both in implementation
of tenure reform and envisaged future governance.
Trancraa provides for transferring land ownership to residents
or accountable local institutions in 23 rural areas currently
held in trustee ownership by the state under apartheid
legislation.5 These Act 9 areas cover 1.8 million ha and are
home to about 70 000 inhabitants in four provinces (Catling
1996).6 Replacing authoritarian, permit-based control, Trancraa
honours the rights of residents by stipulating that people have
to be consulted about land ownership, that their user rights
shall be respected and that future land governance shall be
democratic and nondiscriminatory. With its reliance on non-
elected traditional councils, the Communal Land Rights Act of
2004 departs in major ways from the policy approach of
Trancraa. Valuable lessons might still be drawn from the
experiences with implementing it in Namaqualand.
2. Namaqualand
Namaqualand is an arid to semi-arid area situated inthe northwest corner of South Africa, bordering on theAtlantic and Namibia.7 It is named after the Nama, oneof several Khoe-speaking peoples who, together with
the San, are the indigenous inhabitants of the area. Against
San and Nama resistance, settlers penetrated Namaqualand
from the 1730s. Namaqualand was annexed to the Cape Colony
in two moves of the northern boundary, in 1798 and 1847.
Colonial expansion gradually undermined Nama society
through superior weapons, diseases and economic exploitation
(Boonzaier et al. 1996). Some indigenous people were hunted or
captured and kept on farms as slaves, others fled north seeking
new land.
By the beginning of the 19th century the Nama were largely a
landless proletariat and mission stations became their only
places of refuge. The Namaqualand communal areas were
based on tickets of occupation granted to the mission stations
and the resident populations of indigenous or mixed descent
trying to protect themselves against dispossession and
exploitation. As labour pools and places for surplus people to
Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies 4
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survive, the reserves remained useful for the actors controlling
Namaqualands cyclical mining and farming economy.
Loss of access to natural resources and mens greater access
to paid jobs reduced womens status and exacerbated their
traditionally limited political participation (Archer & Meer 1997).
Women are in a minority as herd and plot owners, but active in
other traditional and emerging land uses, such as tourism and
the collection of medicinal plants and nutritious herbs. In 1994
a large gathering of women met to discuss the General Law
Amendment Act 108 of 1993 that aimed to convert occupation
rights to family lands to ownership, perceived as a threat to
womens interests because in most cases men were the
registered occupiers (Archer & Meer 1997).
The state took administrative control of the areas through the
Mission Stations and Communal Reserves Act 29 of 1909 and
more than 20 other Acts and amendments following it
(Hendricks 1995; Pienaar 2000). Successive apartheid
governments attempted to reform the areas, including the
attempt to force individualisation of community lands in the
economic units programme (Archer et al. 1989). As elsewhere,
these top-down tenure policies created lasting suspicions of
tenure reform as neglecting the real problem of resource
distribution and forcing inappropriate institutions (Letsoalo
1987). People in the Namaqualand Act 9 areas feel strongly
about the loss of ancestral lands to the state, white farmers and
mining companies within a legal system that did not recognise
their land rights as semi-nomadic pastoralists. Yet the official
view has been that Namaqualand rural land claims cannot be
addressed through the Land Claims Court process because of
the constitutional 1913 cut-off date agreed to for land
restitution matters (DLA 2001). However, recent judgments by
the Supreme Court of Appeal (March 2003) and the
Constitutional Court of South Africa (October 2003) have
challenged this view by ruling that the Richtersveld community
is entitled to restitution of land.
Today, Namaqualand comprises about 48 000km2 and a
population of about 80 000 people in four municipalities.8 Some
30 000 people have their homes in six Act 9 areas (NDMT
2000). About one third of 6 000 households in the communal
areas are estimated to be engaged in farming, mainly with small
stock, supplementing wage incomes and state pensions (DoA
2001). Post-apartheid land redistribution has increased the land
available to the communal areas by 21% (Table 1), increasing
the share from 25% to 30% of the total area of Namaqualand.9 In
addition, state farms (372 888ha) have provisionally been
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 5
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approved for allocation to Act 9 area communities. If completed,
this transfer will increase the share to 38% of the total area.
Approximately 670 farm properties, held under individual
title by people of European descent, cover 25 000km2 or 52% of
Namaqualand, averaging 3 700ha each. The number of farmers
is actually much lower, as multiple farm ownership is common,
and a commercial farmers rule of thumb holds that at least
5 000ha are needed for a viable farm. Despite land
redistribution, privately-held farms are on average six times the
size of the average land endowment of a livestock-owning family
in one of the Act 9 areas (645ha). In spite of this disparity in
access to and ownership of land, residents of the Act 9 areas
speak about their sense of belonging: Is ons grond  Its our
land!
Between 1995 and 2000, the six Act 9 areas had their own
transitional local councils, but as of January 2001 new
municipalities incorporated the Act 9 areas with surrounding
private commercial farms and nearby towns.11 Municipalities are
required to prepare integrated development plans (IDPs), which
(in relation to commonage) link land management,
democratically-elected commonage committees and the
introduction of user fees to cover commonage maintenance costs
(Anderson & Pienaar 2003).
Table 1: Certain rural areas or Act 9 areas in Namaqualand
Old Commonage1 New Commonage2 Increase Total3 People ha per
(ha) % (ha) % (ha) % capita
Leliefontein 159 182 13% 32 627 20% 191 809 13% 4 825 40
Concordia 75 693 6% 40 760 54% 116 453 8% 4 564 26
Pella  48 276 4% 34 912 72% 83 188 6% 4 092 20
Komaggas 62 600 5% 27 228 43% 89 828 6% 4 927 18
Steinkopf 329 000 28% 110 023 33% 439 023 31% 7 822 56
Richtersveld 513 919 43% 0 0% 513 919 36% 3 643 141
Total 1 188 670 100% 245 550 21% 1 434 220 100% 29 873 48
Source: SPP 2003: Steinkopf Verslag 4.
1. Act 9 trust land vesting in the state 2. Redistribution farms or new farms 3. Not
included are state farms provisionally allocated to the Act 9 area communities (372 888ha)
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3. Trancraa
3.1 The Act
Trancraa is a remarkably short document of about fivepages. It sets out a broad and flexible framework to befollowed during a transitional period, during whichmunicipalities must examine and report to the minister
of Agriculture and Land Affairs, making recommendations as to
which entity should get ownership rights. While the decision
rests with the minister, the Act spells out various conditions
attendant on this decision. At the time of writing the minister
has yet to make the final decision about the transfer of land.
The main stated aim of Trancraa is to provide for the transfer
of certain land to (1) a municipality; (2) a communal property
association (in terms of the Communal Property Associations Act
28 of 1996); or (3) another body or person approved by the
minister. The transfer of land applies to the Act 9 area held in
trust by the state, but not to township areas, which will
continue to vest in government (excepting residential plots to
which people may register private title). Trancraa recognises and
provides resources to survey, record and map family and
individual use rights and resolve conflicts surrounding these
rights. It explicitly defines the accountability of a municipality to
the right-holders, should it become the owner of the land.13
3.2 The implementation process
Trancraa was formulated within the context of local government
legislation but before all legislation and administrative
structures were in place.14 Implementation therefore had to
await the demarcation of new municipal boundaries and other
matters. Following local government elections in December
2000, the transitional phase of Trancraa was implemented from
January 2001. During 2001 and 2002 Surplus People Project
(SPP)15 worked with locally-elected transformation committees,
municipalities and the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) to
implement the transitional phase of Trancraa in the six Act 9
areas. Public interest lawyers from the Legal Resources Centre
(LRC) participated in strategising and provided training and
legal advice.
The implementation was a process of facilitation and
awareness building. The transformation committees played a
key role in carrying out the tasks of the transitional phase (Box 1),
in co-operation with commonage committees (meentkomitees).
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 7
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The SPP held meetings for lawyers, politicians, developers and
Act 9 area residents in order to impart information about the
Act. The SPP and the transformation committees met almost
every month; DLA, municipalities and the SPP held quarterly
pilot (loods) committee meetings to review progress and make
decisions. SPP, the LRC and the transformation committees
prepared regulations regarding livestock and cropland
management promulgated by the municipalities. Working with
professional surveyors, they recorded family claims to cropland
based on historical use, which proved to be a dynamic and
problematic process of negotiating rights and boundaries.
Tenure reform under the Trancraa legislation turned out to
require time, resources and skills beyond the imagination of
even experienced facilitators.17
Box 1: Tasks of the transformation committees
1. Continuous submission, communication and liaison on the implementation
plan for the transformation process
2. The determination of all residents as defined in section 1 of Trancraa
3. Enquiry and determination of all rights held by residents in the land
4. Conflict resolution and mediation
5. Drafting of a land use and administrative plan
6. Holding public meetings so that all residents are informed about the possible
entities to which the land could be transferred
7. Arranging a referendum for all residents to vote on the choice of an entity to
which the land should be transferred
Source: RSA (2001a).  Public notice, Government Gazette, 6 July
3.3 Community referenda
The Act leaves the means of expressing the community
preferences open and the decision to hold advisory referenda
was arrived at through consultation between the SPP and the
transformation committees. During November 2002 to January
2003, community referenda were held in five of the six areas.
The referenda ballot paper provided three ownership
alternatives: 1) communal property association (CPA),
2) municipality, or 3) option of own choice (including individual
title).
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Table 2: Community referenda on land ownership (Dec 2002Jan 2003)
Municipal % CPA % Own % Spoilt % Votes Total
Leliefontein 59% 37% 1% 3% 889
Richtersveld 4% 94% 0% 2% 1 000
Pella 42% 58% 0% 1% 653
Concordia 44% 53% 0% 3% 419
Steinkopf 45% 52% 1% 2% 2 064
SUM 39% 58% 1% 2% 5 025
Source: Surplus People Project, February 2003
The results show a majority for CPAs in four of the five areas
(Table 1). Less than 1% voted for the own choice option,
reflecting the fact that residents rejected individual privatisation
of commons as impractical and socially irresponsible. The
referendum turnout of about 38% of the voters reflects the fact
that many residents are not active land users, as well as the
perception that past consultation processes were ignored by
government (for example concerning mineral rights and
municipal boundary demarcations).
The referendum victories for CPAs may express distrust of
municipalities as managers of community land or more general
political concerns. Municipal councillors had played a key role
in implementing Trancraa. Although the attitudes and
involvement varied, the process revealed some distrust in the
relationship between the Act 9 area residents and the new
municipal units, creating unforeseen tensions in the Trancraa
process. From 2002, ANC leaders at local and district level had
advocated municipal ownership of land. Some leaders
advocating municipal ownership of the commons warned that
CPAs would be treated no differently from the private farming
sector in the future in that they would be liable to pay a
property tax, rather than to receive development support. This
exacerbated voters fear of isolation and financial difficulties.
Leaders also suggested that only municipal ownership would
protect people against losing land through financial
mismanagement by a CPA and ensure access to land for
vulnerable groups such as women, the poor and the disabled.
Voting for either a CPA or a municipality in some respects
became like choosing between a rock and a hard place: people
were aware that CPAs had a reputation for poor performance in
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 9
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land administration and development. However, they also feared
that municipal ownership would merely shift responsibility to a
lower and poorer level of the state.
Some of these tensions between old tenure practices, legal
reform and young local government institutions were brought
out in community experiences described in the following
section.
4. Participation and resistance: Three cases
4.1 Politics, land and CPA referendum victory  Pella
In Pella on the Gariep (Orange River) in Khâi-MaMunicipality (Pofadder) people share a strong sense ofownership of their common land.21 Both women and menwere active in the process, but womens engagement was
more pronounced here than in other areas where female
farmers are in the minority and often assumed or told not to
take an interest in land (interview with SPP staff, 2002). Pella
experienced tensions between groups linked to the two main
political parties (the African National Congress  ANC  and the
Democratic Alliance). Several respondents complained that
benefits from the municipality such as housing subsidies and
temporary employment were used as patronage to the
supporters of the ANC, provoking some non-members to
complain about the new apartheid introduced in 1994: Some
people think they have more rights than others. Because of the
parties or the politicians. If there is work, some people get the
work, others do not. You have to belong to a certain party (Pella
resident, October 2001).
The polarisation of groups within Pella affected Trancraa more
directly after ANC leaders took a public stance in favour of
municipal ownership in early 2002, placing shared concerns
about land within a broader political struggle. Trancraa involved
a number of confrontations over land rights in tourism and
land development, and some residents claimed that the
municipality was unwilling to hand over land, as demonstrated
by a political leader who tried to control a tourism development
project on community property. On the other hand, some
enterprising farmers who advocated the CPA option also tried to
secure exclusive rights to future irrigated lands, something that
was effectively sidelined by the municipality and SPP.
In this context the new farms and two state farms
provisionally approved for transfer to Pella became an issue:
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should they be included in the referendum and transfer of land
or not? Residents had been informed through newsletters that
all these lands could be transferred to the entity of peoples
choice in the referendum (SPP 2002).22 Shortly before the
referenda in 2002 the municipalities of Khâi-Ma and Nama-Khoi
chose not to follow SPP and DLA advice to include the new
farms. Apart from ANC leaders, voters in Pella (and Concordia)
assumed that the new farms were included. Opposition
leaders, who had advocated CPA ownership, only learnt about
this after the referendum and said it would upset the majority
who had voted for the CPA option.
In spite of political tension, the transformation committee and
SPP succeeded in running a constructive consultation process,
culminating in the charged referendum of 7 December 2002.23
The fact that almost as many people registered for voting as for
the 1999 national election testifies to the thoroughness of the
information and mobilisation campaign led by SPP and the
transformation committee. The Council of Churches monitored
the referenda, with close attention to correct procedure. Before
the result was announced, young female members linked with
the ANC already predicted the outcome and cried because a
CPA would run the community into debt and the land would be
lost. After careful counting the result was announced (58% for
CPA, 42% for municipal ownership).
The young vice-chairman of the Pella ANC said in his speech
that the result was surprising, but the people have spoken and
the process was free and fair. Other reactions by ANC leaders
indicated that they found it difficult to accept the result. Shortly
after the referendum, farmers asking for help with broken water
pipes were told by the municipal officer that there would be no
further support for infrastructure maintenance, driving home
the message that people should start facing up to the
consequences of their choice to reject the municipal option. The
mayor suggested that new rules would soon have to be applied
to the new farms (still municipal property and used, among
others, by some prominent CPA supporters). At the time of
writing, it remains to be seen whether the ANC and the
municipality choose disengagement, obstruction or constructive
involvement in land management in Pella.
4.2 Community division and Trancraa  Komaggas
Komaggas has a special history of community conflict, including
a long-standing dispute over how to justify historical claims to
the land (Sharp 1977; 1994). This conflict deeply affected the
Trancraa process. Opposition to Trancraa came from the
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 11
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powerful Komaggas-inwonersvereniging (residents association).
The leaders of this group, middle-aged to elderly men, argued
that the Act mistakenly assumed that Komaggas belonged to the
state and that residents had a private group title to the land,
granted in the mid-nineteenth century by the governor of the
Cape Colony and Queen Victoria. No transfer back to the
people was therefore required. Instead, opponents linked
Trancraa to a municipal takeover aimed at extracting fees and
taxes. The inwonersvereniging leaders disputed the Acts division
of Komaggas into land in the remainder and town area
(excluded from the transfer). They rejected surveying of both
residential and cultivated plots as contradicting the group title
and leading inevitably to privatisation. Surveyors were
physically chased away by Komaggas residents on several
occasions. The inwonersvereniging had previously launched a
claim to the historical Komaggas land extending to the Atlantic
Coast and expressed confidence that its diamond wealth and
other resources could provide the base for a Komaggas tuisland
(homeland), independent of the municipality. The organisation
had prepared a constitution to be prepared to take ownership
and govern land under the Communal Property Associations Act
of 1996 (KIV 2002). According to SPP, the claim did not follow
formal guidelines and had therefore not been accepted by the
Land Claims Commission. Leaders envisaged that the minister
was giving Komaggas her personal attention:
We already know the options and we have said we support
option 1 [CPA]. Although the minister is in Pretoria, if she
knows that Inwonersvereniging will win, why should she
waste thousands on a referendum and all that. The minister
has our land claim with 300 to 400 names as signatories.
The opposition did not make a land claim. The minister
might look at the voters roll. Why should she then spend a
lot of money on the referendum? If SPP had looked at the
options of everybody, and not decided on the municipality,
then it would have gone well.24 The minister said in 1998: it
is your land. We were told to claim land before the cut-off
date and we have done so. We have written many letters,
but they totally ignored them. (Inwonersvereniging, Executive
Committee, Komaggas, April 2002).
Those in favour of Trancraa, mainly supporters of the ANC,
believed this Act gave residents an opportunity to strengthen
rights to land and to participate in a wider process of
transformation:
I have attended a lot of meetings, and read a little bit of the
Transformation [Act], and think it is a good thing. A lot of
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people did not like [the] Transformation of Certain Rural
Areas [Act], but at the end of the day the old Act was really
an old apartheid Act, that just kept us on one side, and there
was no economic growth and no economic empowerment to
the people of Namaqualand. But most of our people have
still got this tunnel vision that it is our land, so nobody can
come and do anything on it. They even did not want
development, because they did not want to be responsible
for certain things [] They feel that the municipality will
come and do things and that we will lose everything. It is a
fear of payment, a fear of losing baasskap [control,
leadership] over something. Unfortunately, we are sitting
here and the whole country changes, and we did not want
anything to change, but at the end of the day we cannot do
anything about the change. (Former chairman of the
Komaggas Land Committee, November 2001).
Efforts by SPP, DLA and the municipality to resolve the conflict
proved futile. In August 2002, the transformation committee
informed the Nama-Khoi Municipality that they had not
succeeded in implementing Trancraa. The municipality
forwarded the case to the Minister of Agriculture and Land
Affairs, requesting her to make a decision. Some expected her to
give the land to the municipality, while many Komaggas
residents opposed that option and insisted upon their right to
express their view in a referendum. During 2003 the
Inwonersvereniging shifted strategy and started campaigning for
a referendum in Komaggas.
While Komaggas has a unique history, the case also
represents more general features of insecurity linked with
sociopolitical change and confusion about the different legs of
the land reform programme. Sadly, the community attachment
to its diverse land resources did not become a strength for the
tenure reform process; opportunities to clarify and strengthen
individual and family rights were missed and the prospects for
good relations between the community and government
worsened.
4.3 Contested land management planning  Leliefontein
SPP reported that the transformation process in Leliefontein
was the least problematic of the six areas (pers. comm. SPP,
December 2002). The commonage and transformation
committees worked well together with the municipality to fulfil
the requirements of Trancraa.
In line with the Trancraa guidelines (Box 1), the process
included a process of land use planning, and the creation of
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new rules which in many respects replicated grazing and
cropland regulations that had operated under the apartheid era
management boards. Grazing regulations typically involve
headage payments and restrictions on animal numbers,
especially on the new farms. The Leliefontein decision to accept
these new rules was taken by village commonage committees,
many of which were interested in leasing camps on the new
farms. Management rules favour wealthier farmers who have
access to transport and capital to pay herders: not surprisingly,
many camps within the new farms have been allocated to such
mense wat voor staan (people who stand at the front).
Even so, these more wealthy or progressive farmers complain
that the municipality ultimately controls land allocation and
maintenance, rather than the community-elected commonage
committees (Lebert 2004). Linked to the limited capacity of the
Kamiesberg Municipality to enforce grazing rules, the new
farms are already overstocked, predominantly by wealthier
farmers. The idea that the new farms might serve as stepping
stones for more progressive farmers to move out of the commons
onto their own freehold farms is belied by the fact that none
have done so and many move back and forth between the old
and new farms (Rohde et al. 2002). Many farmers with small
herds express the view that the new grazing regulations are
inappropriate to their situation because they depend on being
able to move according to personal circumstances, season and
climatic conditions. Furthermore, many poor farmers are unable
to pay a livestock tax and allege that the municipality is unable
to maintain vital infrastructure such as wind pumps and
fencing, and that grazing fees have been misappropriated.
Regarding croplands and family usufruct rights, SPP and the
local committees were faced with many unclear boundaries and
cases of overlapping ownership. Draft maps showing newly
recorded boundaries were posted and discussed at meetings.
Fields are typically 2ha10ha in extent, but in some instances
surveyors were persuaded to mark off up to 500ha of
commonage surrounding these plots, effectively privatising the
grazing rights of these areas. There was little doubt in farmers
minds that the business of surveying and transforming the
commons in partnership with local government was problematic.
The referendum result in Leliefontein was closely contested,
similar to Pella, Concordia and Steinkopf. Unlike Pella, the
ballot in Leliefontein included the new farms in the
referendum. The outcome (59% majority for municipal
ownership) reflects closer political allegiances with the ANC-
dominated Kamiesberg Municipality. However, problems similar
Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies 14
Contested land tenure reform in South Africa: The Namaqualand experience
Poul Wisborg and Rick Rohde
to those experienced by CPAs involving patronage, transparency
and capacity also exist under the municipal option. While a
legal opinion by LRC tends to favour municipal ownership
because national legislation allows government oversight of the
developmental process, in practice weak capacity in local
government has resulted in an inability to enforce grazing
regulations, a reversal of pro-poor policies associated with the
commons, the imposition of user fees, alleged misappropriation
of funds and a management system that is conceptually
inappropriate to communal farming practice.
5. Discussion and policy lessons for communal land
tenure reform in South Africa
Trancraa was not designed as a pilot project for tenurereform but as a parallel process for areas with adifferent history and legal framework than thehomelands. Here tenure reform shall address areas 10
times as large as those covered by Trancraa and may affect 200
times as many people. However, due to the delays in adopting
and implementing a Communal Land Rights Act, the process of
implementing Trancraa may now provide lessons derived from
the diverse perspectives of residents and leaders in the rural
areas, civil society facilitators, municipal officials, DLA officers
and other policy makers. The comprehensive reports by SPP
submitted in 2003 possibly make Trancraa in Namaqualand the
best documented communal tenure reform ever carried out in
South Africa. Still, one now has to consider the change in policy
objectives and fundamental principles between the White Paper
on South African Land Policy and the Communal Land Rights
Bill adopted six years later. With this caution in mind, in this
section we reflect on the more significant achievements,
constraints and lessons for tenure reform in other areas of
South Africa.
5.1 The tenure reform approach  protecting rights, transferring
ownership
Trancraa offers an unusual opportunity to change the rights and
rules of common property governance through consultative
policy making among land users, civil society organisations and
local government. It provides a flexible legal framework that can
be adapted to the diversity of conditions and needs of the 23 Act
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9 areas. Its brevity and openness are virtues that commend it in
relation to the more proscriptive and detailed approach of the
different later versions of the CLRB. Trancraa thus attempted
what Cousins (2002b) has called legislating for negotiability.
The rights-based approach of Trancraa is most clearly
expressed in the respect for peoples use rights and emphasis
on achieving a balance of rights (section 3) and on non-
discrimination and the accountability of democratic local
government to residents (section 4). Trancraa gives effect (if only
partially) to the policy that individuals who hold rights to
communal land have a right to choose a tenure system
according to their circumstances (for example, DLA 1997:xii). In
spite of social and political tensions, the respect for procedural
rights made a consulted process possible in all cases except
Komaggas. However, the question about whether recording of
family rights was non-discriminatory and promoted the interests
of women land users deserves close scrutiny and further follow-
up. For example, SPP (2003a:38) reports that in Steinkopf only
3% (18 of 488) of family-claimed cultivated lands were registered
in the name of women.
Trancraa was enacted shortly before drafters of the 1999 Land
Rights Bill for the former homelands started raising questions
about risks involved in the transfer model (Claassens 2000).
The 1999 draft Land Rights Bill therefore placed more emphasis
on giving legal protection to de facto rights and transfer of
ownership as a possible subsequent process. Trancraa and later
Communal Land Rights Bills (20014) share a focus on
transferring land. In the case of Trancraa, this transfer
approach reflected demands by some groups to end paternalistic
state trustee ownership. But where Trancraa focuses on
municipalities and certain other legal entities, different
versions of the Communal Land Rights Bill between 2001 and
2004 represent a shift to communities as juristic personae,
traditional authorities and lately the traditional councils.
During the implementation phase, the transfer approach
increasingly unleashed fears, particularly as residents realised
the uncertainty of government support. The Komaggas case
illustrates how conflict over a one-time irreversible transfer
increased the stakes and tensions, and made efforts to record
and protect user rights impossible. Similar tensions were
present in all the areas. In a process that unleashes conflict
about the major stake of ownership, rights of individuals and
families may suffer. Tenure reform must offer adaptable,
stepwise options for protection of rights, in addition to a transfer
of ownership where that is requested (Cousins 2002a; 2002b).
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5.2 Actors and co-ordination
In line with the South African policy of implementing land
reform in co-operation between government and non-
governmental organisations (DLA 1997:104), Trancraa
illustrated how an alliance of government and civil society could
engage land users in participatory tenure reform. Civil society
organisations were not only active in formulating the Act itself,
but also in defending and extending the application of legal
rights during implementation. For example, SPP and LRC
advocacy persuaded the transformation committees to include
referenda in the process; SPP and LRC defended community
interests in cases where community rights to land appeared
threatened and they largely co-ordinated and formulated land
use regulations promulgated by municipalities. To some extent
civil society advocacy compensated for weaknesses of an Act
that, for example, contains no provision for protecting and
promoting womens interests. On the whole, Trancraa appeared
to be a civil society-driven process with national government
providing essential inputs in the form of financial resources and
a legislative framework.
A lesson is that tenure reform requires a clear identification of
the needs that NGOs can address and a strategy for involving
NGOs in communication and advocacy. The dynamic and
mature relationship between Namaqualand communities, the
Surplus People Project and the Legal Resources Centre is
possibly unique and may be hard to reproduce.
Trancraa was generally implemented as a consultation with
the Act 9 area residents who held the right to participate under
the terms of Trancraa. There was no social movement to create
popular links between the different Act 9 areas and put
pressure on government and other outsiders such as
commercial farmers, developers, provincial government and the
facilitators. Quarterly loods or pilot committee meetings ensured
a degree of co-ordination between municipalities, DLA and SPP,
but a broader stakeholder forum involving business, commercial
farmers and other government departments could have been
useful to pursue development opportunities created by tenure
reform.
The fact that municipalities had a formal responsibility for
implementation, and that they were possible future owners of
land and political actors, placed them in an invidious position,
giving rise to accusations of partisan behaviour.
The Act puts the municipality in a very central position in a
process where they are an interested party. This was
problematic from the word go, and should be avoided at all
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costs in any further tenure reform consultation processes
(SPP staff, comment on earlier draft, 2003).
On the other hand, the transformation committees and
facilitators led a process of information dissemination,
community meetings and finally referenda in five Act 9 areas
and this gave the community a chance to hold municipal leaders
accountable. In Pella both the CPA and municipal ownership
were advocated by individuals who pursued narrow economic
interests that threatened to unleash conflict.  During the
Trancraa process SPP and LRC contributed to clarifying rights
issues and settling conflicts.  The final expression of the
majority view on land ownership was also a valuable expression
of local democracy. The Komaggas breakdown shows how
important it is that most community members and groups feel
that they own the process of tenure reform. In spite of
Trancraas effort to link tenure reform with land use planning,
the Leliefontein case contains warning signals that it remains
difficult for community and local government to prepare and
enforce responsive land management plans. Thus together the
three cases demonstrate how tenure reform triggers and reveals
fragile, multidimensional relations between individuals,
communities and local government, testing how democracy 
political, participatory and economic  is emerging and is
contested in rural areas.
5.3 Resources for implementation and tenure redress
The Trancraa process represents a small but significant
investment by government. It is important to stress that the
time, funding and institutional support required to carry out
tenure reform under Trancraa was seriously underestimated.
We estimate that the total financial expenditure by the state
was approximately R3 million or about R100 for each of the
30 000 inhabitants of the six Namaqualand rural areas17.
Tenure reform in the former homelands of South Africa is going
to be hugely more demanding due to the size and complexity of
the populations, areas and institutional structures. One may
still imagine that there is an economy of scale by working with
large areas and groups. If one assumes that efficient DLA-NGO
partnerships can do the job at 50% of the per capita cost that
was incurred in the arid Namaqualand setting  which appears
optimistic  the expenditure is R700 million (compared to an
annual land reform budget of approximately R1 billion).
Whether the South African government is willing to invest this
much in communal land tenure reform is a matter of political
priorities. The question of funding for implementation and
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institutional support in the Communal Land Rights Bill has
remained unclear: The official DLA estimate when the Bill was
adopted by Cabinet was R68 million per year over an
unspecified number of years (DLA 2003), but this was revised in
the January 2004 hearings to between R408 million and R544
million (presumably total implementation cost). Senior DLA staff
argued that budgets could not be prepared in time for the
hearings and parliamentary debate due to the drastic changes
in the Bill in Cabinet in October 2003 (PMG 2004).
Neither in word nor in deed did Trancraa give effect to the
constitutional right to comparable redress for people who fail to
gain, or lose, from the reform process. This has been addressed in
various versions of the Communal Land Rights Bill, but in vague
terms in the version adopted by Cabinet (Marcus 2003:910). It is
not clear whether and to what extent the 2003 costing of the
Communal Land Rights Bill includes tenure redress. After the
Bill/Act itself, a detailed budget is probably the clearest
expression of government commitment to providing tenure
security.
5.4 Tenure reform, development support and transformation
Rather than an internal reconfiguration of rights, the
Constitution and land policy envisage that tenure reform is part
of a transformative process that transcends the legal dualism
and physical boundaries of the apartheid landscape, a healing
the divisions of the past. Tenure reform is the fundamental and
future-oriented leg of land reform because it shall give
institutional security to (some of the) resources transferred
under restitution and redistribution: Tenure reform is the
mother of South Africas land reform programmes (Sibanda
2001:53). In spite of a neo-liberal macroeconomic policy, policy
makers have maintained a continuity from the Reconstruction
and Development Programme to the Constitution and the 1997
White Paper on Land Policy that tenure reform is integral to and
depends on state support for rural development:
Tenure reform will indeed have a positive impact on the
socio-economic development of these areas if it is
accompanied by institutional and extension support. Tenure
reform is therefore a necessary but not on its own a
sufficient condition for socio-economic development. It must
thus be accompanied by access to inputs, credit, extension
services, assistance with transport, provision of access to
markets and government complementary actions to stimulate
the rural economy. Only then can the full benefits of tenure
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reform be realised in terms of increased production of goods
and services, growth and investment. Tenure reform must
thus not only be seen as a set of measures aimed at
combating rural poverty, it must also be seen as forming a
firm basis for rural development and economic prosperity
for individual households and communities. (Mayende
2001:4, similarly Sibanda 2001:3).
Trancraa did not include land development or guarantees of
future institutional support: links between tenure reform and
development were weak or absent. Two former DLA employees
who had worked with tenure reform expressed frustration at the
lack of resources for adequate implementation, service provision
and sustainable development after the transfer of land
(interviews, April 2002). A lawyer from the Legal Resources
Centre said that, Trancraa is a chance for the state to bail out
(April 2002). Asked about the uncertainty of future
institutional support, an SPP facilitator responded that, That is
the only thing that is for certain, that there is not going to be any
support! (October 2002). A Namaqualand researcher commented
that communal land is like exhausted mine land, no longer core
business within a corporate model of governance (S Robins,
pers. comm, December 2002). Reflecting a similar kind of
pessimism or realism, local government leaders expressed
reluctance to support land management in communities opting
for CPAs.
To realise wider development objectives and to change the
skewed distribution of assets and opportunities, one must
consider what capacity people have to influence and derive
benefits from new land rights; how will such rights support
them in enhancing livelihood practices and entering new
economic sectors? Trancraa became most meaningful when local
people started exploring and planning new ventures that they
felt were facilitated by tenure reform, which in turn led them to
identify other constraints. In that way, tenure reform became
part of a learning process: planning the steps from owning land
to owning development. However, people have little support in
acquiring the skills, financial resources and appropriate
technology that may enable them to become effective actors in
development. Without support, change may not happen or will
be controlled by external investors, traditional leaders or
government officials. The absence of development support made
it difficult to take proactive measures to assist and involve
vulnerable or marginal groups, such as herders hired from
outside the communities and women farmers.
Communities affected by Trancraa in Namaqualand mainly
Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies 20
Contested land tenure reform in South Africa: The Namaqualand experience
Poul Wisborg and Rick Rohde
live in municipal townships and will therefore continue to
receive municipal services regardless of land ownership.
However, throughout South Africa, many communities are
dispersed across communal areas. Transferring title may
hinder provision of desperately needed water, electricity,
sanitation and other services. The 2003 CLRB does not remove
the constraints on developing infrastructure and services on
private land (De Waal 2003).
Late in the Trancraa process, people increasingly discussed
the option of letting the land remain in trust with central
government (SPP staff, October 2002, referring to Steinkopf and
Concordia). After long deliberations over what ultimately became
reduced to only two legal options for vesting land rights, many
participants felt that neither of them would work unless the
government supported land administration and agricultural
development (McIntosh Xaba 2003).
Institutional support is not merely a desirable add-on, but is
necessary to give meaning to new rights and the demanding
exercise of consulting on land tenure reform, which makes for
the difference between permit-based and rights-based land
governance. Communal tenure reform will continue to test the
South African democratic and developmental state and its ability
to protect and enhance this complex public good  security of
tenure for the users of the land.
At the time of writing (over a year after the referenda in
Namaqualand), the minister has yet to make a decision about
the future transfer of ownership. Transformation reports,
prepared by LRC, SPP and the municipalities, were submitted to
the minister in September 2003 with no clear recommendation
that she abide by the referenda outcomes, except in the case of
Richtersveld. Advice with regard to other Act 9 areas
recommends that in the event that the minister transfers land
to a CPA, the relevant municipality must:
Negotiate an agreement with the CPA whereby the
municipality undertakes management and control of the
land and administers the users rights on behalf of the CPA
in terms of municipal regulations and the constitutional
conditions. (SPP 2003b).
The municipality will make necessary amendments on matters
of existing grazing rights, cropland regulations, the constitution
of the commonage committee and the progress of service
delivery agreement, including the fixing of service delivery fees.
Where the minister decides in favour of municipal ownership,
the same principles regarding the value of rights and
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 21
No.       Occasional Paper Series26
community interests should be stipulated in the Associations
constitution, just as it is in that of the CPA (SPP 2003b:section
7.6.4).
In other words, regardless of whether the ownership passes to a
CPA or a municipality, the latter will have effective control and
responsibility for determining and administering land rights. In
the event that the minister makes a determination contrary to
the will of the residents as expressed in the referenda, she will
have made a mockery of the democratic process and called into
question either the basic consultative framework of the Act or
the probity of the NGOs and transformation committees in
instituting a vote. This dilemma is lodged at the heart of the
latest CLRB in the form of the ministers wide-ranging and
ultimate decision-making powers in relation to a final
determination and transfer of rights (RSA 2004:section 19).
5.6 Lessons
Strengthened tenure rights appear vulnerable if isolated from
training, finance and integrated development initiatives. A neo-
liberal assumption that property rights and markets by
themselves will transform rural areas where people are in deep
crisis due to unemployment, corruption, food insecurity and
HIV/Aids appears ill-founded and dangerous, because it
disregards the many other constraints on equal participation in
the economy. To move from tenure reform to transformation
requires a holistic focus on the human rights and the local
tenure rights of land users through law and in practice.
Summing up, we suggest some lessons from the Namaqualand
experience with land tenure reform in 200102.
! Tenure reform must be about enhancing systems of
governance that incorporate more adaptable and open-
ended rights than ownership.
! Local social movements that mobilise and hold leaders
accountable are essential for effective tenure reform
implementation.
! Civil society organisations made the process happen and
defended residents rights. To use this approach requires
careful planning to identify what services are needed, who
can provide them and how their accountability to both
residents and government is secured. The protection and
promotion of gender equality in changing tenure rights and
participation in governance requires special attention to
equal mobilisation of gender groups, careful analysis of
gendered interests in resources and practices, and firm
promotion of individual rights of land users.
! Recording and mapping family and individual user rights is
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essential but requires a high degree of transparency and
community involvement in order to avoid appropriation of
common land by powerful individuals.
! Incapacity to participate in a tenure reform process may
translate into a loss of rights for large groups of vulnerable
households, including those headed by children and elderly
people.
! Both institutional support and adequate funding are
essential to the tenure reform process. Implementers of
Trancraa may be consulted on the preparation of realistic
budgets for tenure reform.
! The centralised decision-making powers of the minister
could seriously devalue the consultative process, making a
mockery of any so-called democratic involvement by the
affected communities.
It is unreasonable to load the challenge of poverty eradication
onto land tenure reform alone. Property rights are not magic
and do not exist in a policy vacuum. Judged by the experiences
in the contested commons of Namaqualand, most rural South
Africans will have to struggle for increased land tenure security
for many years to come.
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1. Poul Wisborg is a PhD candidate at Noragric, Agricultural
University of Norway, PO Box 5001, 1432 Aas, Norway
(poul.wisborg@noragric.nlh.no). The Programme for Land
and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) at the University of the
Western Cape and Noragric co-operate on the programme
Human rights, governance and land reform in South Africa,
financed by Norad through the Norwegian Centre for
Human Rights, University of Oslo.
 2. Dr. Rick Rohde (rick@rohde.fsbusiness.co.uk) is a research
fellow at the Centre of African Studies, University of
Edinburgh and a senior researcher at PLAAS, currently
studying environmental history and land use in
Namaqualand with a focus on Leliefontein.
3. At the time of writing the exchange rate was R7=US$1.
4. Including legal opinions for the Commission on Gender
Equality, the Human Rights Commission and the Legal
Resources Centre that viewed the Communal Land Rights
Bill as inconsistent with the Constitution (RSA 2003a;
PLAAS/NLC 2003; Commission on Gender Equality 2003;
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Moore & Deane 2003; and De Waal 2003). Hearing and
submissions are available at the Parliamentary Monitoring
Group website www.pmg.org.za/. The Bill was passed during
the short parliamentary session in February 2004, leading
to new strongly-worded criticism (Mail & Guardian 2004;
Govender 2004).
5. Rural Coloured Areas Act 24 of 1963 and Rural Areas Act 9
of 1987 (hence Act 9 areas, used in this paper).
6. The area corresponds to about 10.5% and the population to
less than 0.5% of that of the former homelands.
7. The major part falls in the Succulent Karoo plant
geographical region, a desert shrub land, with foggy, mainly
winter rainfall of 200400mm. It has a high diversity of plant
life (a total of about 3 000 species, one third of which are
succulents). Low variability in rainfall in the central region
explains the biological uniqueness, with between four to six
times as many species as comparable winter rainfall deserts
in for example Morocco and the Americas (Cowling & Pierce
1999). The eastern part, known as Bushmanland (in which
Pella falls), is a desert shrub land with lower and more
erratic summer rainfall.
8. Kamiesberg, Nama-Khoi, Richtersveld and Khâi-Ma
Municipalities are part of the new Namakwa District (DC6).
9. Farms have been bought by government from farmers and
mining companies under the Municipal Commonage
Programme. Farms vest in the municipalities subject to
conditions that they must be used for the benefit of
residents in the Act 9 areas (245 550ha) and poor residents
of other towns (73 752ha). New farms in Namaqualand
amount to 23% of total land area (1.35 million ha)
redistributed in South Africas land redistribution
programme and about 3% of household beneficiaries
(reflecting the low carrying capacity of the extensive
rangeland). (Anderson & Pienaar 2003).
10. About 25% of the land constitutes Act 9 areas, 5%
constitutes new farms, 8% is owned by mines, 5% is under
conservation (including 162 445ha Act 9 land in the
Richtersveld), and 8% constitutes state farms approved for
transfer to Act 9 communities and other public land (DoA
2001).
11. For example, a new Nama-Khoi municipality (headquarters
in Springbok) includes the three former rural areas of
Komaggas, Steinkopf and Concordia. The three areas
comprise about 17 000 people and 6 500km2 of communal
land (SPP 2003b).
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12. In 2002 an NGO staff member involved predicted that a
transfer would be announced as good news just ahead of
the 2004 general election.
13. Trancraa, section 4: A municipality that becomes the owner:
a) Must afford residents a fair opportunity to participate in
the decision-making processes regarding the administration
of the land; b) Must not discriminate against any resident;
c) Must give residents reasonable preference in decisions
about access to the land; d) Must not sell or encumber the
land, or any substantial part of it, without the consent of a
majority of residents at a public meeting called for that
purpose; e) Is accountable to the residents; f) Must manage
and record effectively all financial transactions regarding the
land; and g) Has fiduciary responsibilities in relation to
residents.
14. The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of
1998 and the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32
of 2000.
15. Surplus People Project (www.spp.org.za) is a civil society
organisation assisting rural communities in the Northern
and Western Cape and has undertaken research, advocacy
and land reform implementation in Namaqualand since
1987. SPP participated in drafting and preparing the Act. Its
January 2001 tender to facilitate Trancraa in the six
Namaqualand rural areas was approved by DLA only in
October 2001, contributing to delays in the transition
phase.
16. These committees had previously been established in order
to assist transitional local councils (governing the Act 9
areas from 19952000) with managing additional
commonage (new farms), acquired through the land
redistribution programme.
17. The SPPs contract with the DLA to facilitate the process in
Namaqualand was worth R2 million for the two-year period
20012002. In addition, DLA, local government and the LRC
incurred costs, adding an estimated R1 million to the costs
over this two-year period, in total equalling R100 or US$15
for each inhabitant of the six Act 9 areas affected.
18. The residents of Komaggas did not vote due to conflict over
Trancraa, see section 5.2.
19. A majority for the CPA option was pronounced in
Richtersveld (94%), where community mobilisation had been
more vigorous as a result of court cases dealing with land
claims, and where a CPA had already been formed.
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20. The number of people voting were equal to 37% of all voters
in the five areas, or 39% of the people on the voters list for
the 1999 national elections (SPP 2003:4 and 64).
21. Pella land includes Act 9 land addressed by Trancraa
(48 276ha  51%), new farms (34 913ha  37%) and state
farms provisionally approved for transfer (11 751ha 12%).
22. Transferring new farms in the Trancraa process was in
accordance with Notification 12, based on the Local
Government: Municipal Systems Act of 2000, but required
confirmation by the municipality. A senior provincial DLA
official confirmed that it had been the intention that all the
lands should be included in the same transfer process
(discussion, December 2002).
23. Of the five areas, Pella had the greatest turnout: 1 114
individuals (compared to 1 159 for the 1999 national
election) registered to vote, of whom 54% were women. Of
those who registered, 653 (59%) voted (SPP 2003b:64).
24. For SPP, the Trancraa process was a delicate political
balancing act. Different actors accused SPP staff of
advocating either of the major ownership options.
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